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This Working Paper relates to the CBR Research Programme on Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the supply of business advice using new empirical evidence 
from a large scale survey of SMEs. The chief focus of the paper is on a 
comparison of suppliers that operate in different environments of regulation, 
contract and reputation. The paper argues that interaction intensity varies with the 
level of information asymmetry of these different environments, between different 
types of service supplier and their clients. Interaction intensity between suppliers 
also varies as a result of the level of trust they enjoy: for example, the low trust 
enjoyed by consultants appears to encourage higher intensity of interaction which 
improves the tailoring of the service to the client’s needs and enhances impact. 
The paper assesses interaction intensity using the existence of site visits and/or a 
written brief/contract as indicators. Although these measures have limitations, the 
paper demonstrates clear and significant differences between suppliers in terms of 
interaction intensity, use of contracts and impact in three broad categories: private 
sector consultancy (low trust, high intensity, high impact), business associations 
(high trust, low intensity, moderate impact) and government support agencies 
(moderate trust, moderate to high intensity, moderate or low impact). Multivariate 
estimation methods demonstrate that significant differences in interaction 
intensity, use of contracts and impact by client type are much less important than 
differences in supplier type. This indicates that suppliers generally develop more 
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The use of external suppliers of business advice has become a major 
aspect of most firms’ activities in both manufacturing and service 
sectors. A number of previous studies has argued that the supply of 
business services is different from other goods because they have 
mixtures of attributes, identified by Mills and Margulies (1980) and 
Clark (1995) as both task-interactive and personal-interactive, which 
require close interaction between client and producer. Furthermore, 
services have specific characteristics of intangibility, inseparability, 
heterogeneity and perishability that require interactions to be particularly 
intense, and often prolonged. This can require detailed on-site appraisals 
and continued client-supplier exchanges which other goods rarely need 
(see e.g. Wilson, 1972; Cowell, 1984; O’Farrell and Hitchens, 1990; 
Clark, 1995). Intense interaction can be viewed as a means of 
overcoming information asymmetries on both sides: of the supplier’s 
uncertainty about the specific form of the clients demands; and of the 
client’s uncertainty about the type of service that is needed. The extent 
of the market in any specific field will depend on the ease with which 
interaction can be developed and these information asymmetries 
overcome. This will be easier for some types of supplier than others; for 
example, where suppliers possess recognised quality assurance 
procedures or are regulated, which can generate higher levels of trust 
between the client and the supplier. 
 
This paper concerns the supply of business advice to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). The advice assessed in our empirical study 
focuses on the range of different suppliers used and their “impact on 
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provision of basic information. This empirical focus seeks to highlight 
two aspects: one, those situations where advice is delivered through 
more intense exchanges, and a second, where the differences between 
suppliers is brought to the centre of attention.  
 
Our focus on a broad range of suppliers and advice processes follows 
from the widespread discussion in the literature on SMEs which has 
argued that SMEs often have a greater need than larger firms to buy-in 
external assistance, but a greater reluctance to do so (see e.g. Birley and 
Westhead, 1992; CBI, 1995; DTI, 1990; DE, 1991; Storey, 1994). This 
literature has also found that there are usually important differences 
between SMEs by size, with the smallest firms usually employing 
external advice to the least extent, with a rising level of use by size up to 
firms of 50-100 employees, after which point there may be a levelling 
off (O’Farrell and Moffatt, 1995; Bennett and Robson, 1999). 
 
Because of a perceived general reluctance of SMEs to seek external 
advice, and a particularly strong reluctance identified among owner-
managed businesses (DE, 1991; Storey, 1994), a number of government 
initiatives have sought either to stimulate the supply of advice or to 
encourage SME demand. In the 1997 period covered by our survey the 
main government approach has been developed through a network of 
local agents: Business Link, Training and Enterprise Councils and 
enterprise agencies. Each of these has sought to offer free or subsidized 
advisors, thus attempting to overcome supply constraints at a local level 
accessible to SMEs. By use of large scale local publicity campaigns, 
including mailing and local events these initiatives have also sought to 
stimulate SME demand. 
 
Our focus on supplier types has the important purpose of establishing the 
character of the advice that these public sector agents offer and its 
impact on the client. To act as comparison groups we use two other 
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associations. 
 
Business consultants in many cases are involved with government’s 
local agencies as subcontractors or to service SME clients. An important 
issue, therefore, arises as to whether the business consultants as accessed 
through government agencies differ in the client’s perception of impact 
from those accessed through the general market. A further issue has been 
the extent to which the free or subsidized service provided by 
government agencies unfairly competes with the private sector. This has 
been a contentious issue for business associations. In the case of local 
chambers of commerce, the competition is on the same patch, but even 
sector associations have complained about unfair competition from 
Business Link (see e.g. Bennett, 1998; BPIF, 1997). 
 
A primary focus of this paper is therefore on how advice differs between 
these supplier types. Because of this focus, and because we wish to 
establish whether there exist any large scale statistical regularities 
between supplier types, we adopt a large scale survey format and have to 
use a mail out methodology. Unfortunately this precludes detailed 
assessment of the process by which advice is delivered. Also because of 
the wide range of other questions that had to be included in the survey, it 
was not possible to include questions about prior use of advice sources, 
frequency of use, and a number of other characteristics that would have 
been desirable. This paper must be seen therefore as an assessment of 
advice intensity undertaken at a fairly extensive level, with advantages 
of breadth and generality, but with disadvantages of depth of how the 
advice process works. However, we seek to compare our interpretations 
against more detailed and smaller scale studies which we demonstrate, in 
general, to be in line with our conclusions.  
 
With this approach in mind, the paper first examines the theoretical 
literature to determine the expectations of interaction intensity for 
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examined in the main contribution of the paper which is an empirical 
examination of the hypotheses using a new large scale sample from a 
survey of 1997 by the Cambridge ESRC Centre for Business Research 
(see Cosh and Hughes, 1998). 
 
2. Interaction  Intensity 
 
Business services have been shown to be quite different from consumer 
services and from the purchase of manufactured goods (see e.g. Hill and 
Neeley, 1988; Morris and Fuller, 1989; Dawes et al., 1992; Jackson et 
al., 1995; Clark, 1995; Brentani and Ragot, 1996). Our analysis of 
advice services focuses on the central element of professional services: 
that offer an increase in knowledge and expertise that is highly 
knowledge-based and intangible. They primarily “supply expertise and 
enhance the value of all other sectors’ outputs, including that of other 
services” (O’Farrell and Moffat, 1991, p. 206). They are thus chiefly a 
process that produces change to the business customer (Dwyer, et al., 
1987; Riddle, 1986) that requires an increase in the knowledge pool on 
both sides: ‘production’ of the service is in some senses a joint activity 
of the buyer and seller. 
 
Professional business services require interactions based on relational 
exchanges (Clark, 1995; O’Farrell and Moffat, 1991) whereby the 
client’s needs are established by the advisor, and advisor’s ability and 
quality assurances are assessed by the client. In the information 
exchange process, personal relationships are important in allowing 
implicit assumptions and obligations to be explored, and trust to 
develop. This will usually combine task-interaction, where the client and 
supplier exchange information on problems to be solved and means to 
accomplish them, with personal-interaction, where the client’s well-
being is directly improved (by making internal tasks easier or by 
improving profitability and performance). As Clark (1995) argues, these 
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usually distinct. Clark (1993; 1995), reviewing earlier literature (for 
example Wilson (1972), Levitt (1981), Cowell (1984) and Marshall 
(1988)) has focused on four key differentiating but overlapping 
characteristics of business advice and consultancy services: their 
intangibility, inseparability of interactions, heterogeneity, and 
perishability. (i) Intangibility means that services do not take the form of 
a material product (see e.g. Walker, 1985). This makes them difficult to 
sample before purchase and difficult to reproduce. However, there are 
clearly degrees of intangibility so that some services are more intangible 
than others e.g. management training is highly intangible, but many 
mainstream banking services have product characteristics resembling 
tangible goods. Also it is important not to overemphasise intangibility 
since all services become tangible as part of final demand, whether that 
is in the form of a good or a service. (ii) The inseparability of services 
means that buyers and sellers must interact to refine the advice process, 
with a long series of stages to refine need, select the advisor and develop 
the actual delivery of advice. (iii) Heterogeneity of services means that 
they are not generally standardized. Advice services usually need to be 
re-tailored to each client with elements of uniqueness. This leads to 
problems of quality control and to the need for the customer to become 
closely involved with production to check appropriateness and fitness 
for purpose. Clark (1995) argues that a large part of the client 
assessment of appropriateness may depend on impressions and how they 
are managed by the advisor. (iv) Perishability occurs because services 
are destroyed during consumption and have to be repeated. For strategic 
advice the ownership of the service, including some of the intellectual 
property rights, transfer from the seller to the buyer, which the buyer 
may reproduce internally. This means that although repeat business often 
occurs, the new purchase will usually be for a service that is 
significantly different from previous purchases, requiring new tailoring. 
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distinguishing characteristics of professional advice services are the high 
level of expertise required (requiring high education, knowledge and 
experience levels), group and self-regulating identity among the advisors 
that creates an impression or reality of quality, a history of professional 
ethics, and an emphasis on fields of advice that have high cost and high 
importance to the business. 
 
All of these characteristics result in a high human asset specificness of 
the business service supply process, which in turn depends chiefly on 
knowledge-based technical skills which are exchanged with the client. 
The importance of this knowledge base in turn means that there is often 
an information asymmetry between buyer and seller. The intense 
interaction process necessary for successful advice and consultancy is 
chiefly aimed at overcoming this asymmetry. There are two aspects to 
this information asymmetry - ex ante and ex post (see Nayyar, 1990; 
Gallouj, 1997). Ex ante asymmetries derive from lack of information by 
the buyer of the seller’s service quality or characteristics. This makes it 
difficult for a buyer to select a service supplier: all suppliers may appear 
to be the same, or are indistinguishable. Ex post asymmetries derive from 
the buyer’s inability to assess fully the actions taken by the supplier. On 
the one hand, services are inherently difficult to define in a contract and 
therefore the supplier has considerable scope to cut costs or quality 
without detection by the seller. Therefore the buyer finds it difficult to 
be sure if value for money has been obtained. On the other hand, the 
outputs often pervade a wide range of management activities, including 
change behaviour or strategies of the managerial personnel, from which 
specific outputs are difficult to measure. Thus there are many difficulties 
of attributing increases in profit, turnover or productivity to the specific 
advice services received. The evaluation of outputs is particularly 
difficult for ‘softer’ (more intangible) fields of services such as advice, 
which are the focus of our empirical study, compared with more specific 
  7or technical services such as repairs, maintenance, production line 
development, etc. 
 
As Holmstrom (1985), Nayyar (1990) Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and 
Gallouj (1997) note, there are a number of remedies for these 
asymmetries, and each has a different level of relevance to different 
sources of advice. Clark (1995, Chapter 4) identifies the three main 
remedies for information asymmetries as: contractual structures, 
regulation (and self-regulation), and reputation or ‘ brand’. Clark 
emphasises the importance of the signals which these different remedies 
give, particularly in the selection process, of how an advisor is chosen. 
This is an important interpretation for our analysis because it allows us 
to draw out important distinctions between types of suppliers of advice. 
 
Contractual structures seek to control the advice process by detailed 
product specification, contingent fees, post-delivery contractual 
holdbacks conditional on performance, and output-related bonuses or 
penalties. Dawes et al. (1997), and Clark (1995) find that the cost 
element of advisors is not usually a key selection criterion, being a 
‘moderate’ issue in Dawes et al. study and being the seventh most 
important aspect of success in obtaining assignments in Clark’s study. 
However, contracts in more general terms than cost alone have a 
somewhat greater importance, being used by 72% of O’Farrell and 
Moffat’s (1995) sample of advertising and marketing, graphic design, 
computer/MIS and training advisors, and used by between 33-90% of 
recruitment consultants for different aspects of their services in Clark’s 
(1993) study. Day and Barksdale (1992) find that important aspects of 
contracts to the client are on-time on-budget delivery, and up-front 
schedules that are stuck to.  
 
Regulation by government, or self-regulation by industries bodies, is a 
second way to reduce asymmetries. Clark (1995) argues that because of 
the extremely low barriers to entry to the advice and consultancy market, 
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he argues that government regulation is “weak” and self-regulation is a 
“patchwork” (op. cit., p. 73) for the consultancy area. Some sources of 
the consultancy and advice are, however, highly regulated, as for 
example financial advice following IMRO and FSA rules. Other sources 
have a government framework of self-regulation that prevents market 
entry unless professional training qualifications have been attained and 
are routinely updated e.g. legal services via the Law Society, and 
accountancy and financial advice via the accounting bodies. The 
Government since 1997 is seeking to strengthen these standards further 
by separating the regulatory functions from representative functions of 
the accounting bodies. For government agencies themselves there are 
also extremely burdensome regulations defined by the parent 
government departments, although these are more often framed in terms 
of supplier performance on cost or activity criteria than client 
evaluations. For our analysis of suppliers, the extent of regulatory and 
self-regulatory frameworks, as an ex ante signalling of quality, is likely 
to be an important differentiating aspect between suppliers. 
 
Reputation and ‘brand’ have been found to be the key selection criteria 
for advisors when studying most types of private sector consultants. 
Reputation derives from a range of elements: existing relations with 
clients, the reputation of the individual consultant, the reputation of the 
consultancy firm, the general image of quality, and third party 
recommendation (Clark, 1995, Table 4.2). These features account for 
70% to 93% of client rankings of selection criteria is Clark’s study of 
recruitment consultants, with prior experience the most important 
criterion employed overall. Similar findings are reported for other types 
of consultants by Day and Barksdale (1992), Wheiler (1987), Dawes et 
al. (1992), and Bryson (1997). Reputation and ‘branding’ are seen as key 
means by which ex ante information asymmetries can be diminished or 
overcome by Shapiro, (1983), Nayyar (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts 
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the information in the market between suppliers and their clients.  
 
However, reputation and branding do not guarantee quality, they merely 
limit the effects resulting from asymmetries: of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Their role will also tend to vary with the type of service 
and type of supplier. Recognising the importance of service and supplier 
type, Clark (1993) argues that there will be different mechanisms of 
exchange and interaction in different service markets, and that the 
mechanisms depend on the extent of trust between buyer and seller. For 
different suppliers, trust has differential roles in determining the extent 
to which reputation and brand, or other more formal regulatory 
mechanisms are used to signal quality and hence reduce information 
asymmetries. This means that in our supplier comparisons we seek to 
place a high emphasis on the different signalling processes used by 
different types of supplier. 
 
Trust is generally argued to depend on two dimensions (see Zucker, 
1986; quoted in Clark, 1993). The first is personal trust. Personal trust 
draws on social similarity between people within a market, which is 
therefore firm, industry and context specific. The second dimension, 
institutional trust, derives from the broader social and regulatory context 
of each supplier, which is largely exogenous to a particular firm or 
industry. Zucker argues that the two types of trust depend on different 
sources. The first depends largely on the extent and the form of personal 
networks. Different types of personal networks encourage or discourage 
certain types of economic behaviour, as argued by Granovetter (1985). 
Zucker’s second type of trust, institutional trust, draws on association 
structures, such as memberships of business and professional 
associations, and on intermediary mechanisms such as government 
regulation or third-party standards bodies (such as the British Standards 
Institutes BSI, or ISO). Suppliers with stronger development of these 
kinds of institutional structures may be able to signal a greater level of 
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uncertainty, and stimulating a higher level of trust, which in turn can 
stimulate a greater willingness to seek services from these particular 
external suppliers. If this trust is well-founded, this should lead to higher 
quality assurance and hence impact levels. In practise the two types of 
trust overlap with each other and may be difficult to separate in 
empirical studies.  
 
Because of the difficulties of separating different types of trust in 
practice one way of proceeding is to assess client responses to different 
types of suppliers of advice that operate within different networks of 
trust. In empirical investigation we use this way of assessing trust; i.e. 
we attribute differences between suppliers to the different trust and 
reputation producing mechanisms that exist for different supplier types. 
 
3.  Methodology and Hypotheses 
 
The previous theoretical literature has focused on the exchange process 
needed to overcome information asymmetries and to achieve the desired 
quality controls for the buyer of business advice services. Different 
intensities of interaction are expected to produce different impacts on the 
buyer of services. Impacts in turn will depend on the networks that exist 
which relate suppliers to each other, and which relate buyers to sellers. 
Different suppliers operate in different environments of contractual 
relations, regulation/self-regulation, and reputation which have differing 
contexts of trust, some more strongly emphasising personal trust, others 
institutional trust, and some with mixtures of the two. We would 
therefore expect some systematic variations by supplier type and by 
buyer type, and particularly between government agencies and other 
suppliers, depending on the extent to which information asymmetries 
can be overcome by reliance on the different mechanisms of reputation, 
regulation, self-regulation or other forms of quality control external to 
the buyer. Interaction intensity is an outcome that reflects these 
  11differences. Our central hypotheses which we investigate below are 
therefore twofold: 
 
1.  Interaction intensity will vary between types of suppliers depending 
on the extent of internal quality controls (such as reputation) or 
external quality assurance, regulation and trust producing 
mechanisms. 
2.  The evaluation of outputs by the client will tend to show higher 
impact the higher is interaction intensity. 
 
To assess these hypotheses we focus on one measure of interaction 
intensity, of (i) whether or not the service was delivered through site 
visit(s). We compare service supplier outputs using impact levels 
assessed by the client, and assess the extent to which these vary with 
interaction intensity. We also measure the form of client-supplier 
relations using (ii) whether or not a written contract was used. 
 
The role of written briefs/contracts has been examined before as a means 
to assess the control executed by clients over their advisors. For 
example, O’Farrell and Moffat (1995, Table 4), using a matched sample 
of 59 manufacturing plants in two regions (Scotland and SE England), 
demonstrated a statistically significant difference in satisfaction levels 
between clients that used a verbal agreement, a written brief or contract, 
or used neither. Satisfaction levels were 25% higher for advice delivered 
using written briefs compared to verbal agreements, and for different 
service fields were between 3 and 13 times higher for verbal or written 
agreement, respectively, compared to having no agreement at all prior to 
the service being provided. The positive effect of the use of a written 
brief or contract is interpreted by O’Farrell and Moffat (1995, p. 115) as 
diminishing the gap between prior client expectations and the actual 
service supplied, i.e. overcoming information asymmetries on both sides. 
However, O’Farrell and Moffat (1995, Table 5) found that there were 
important contrasts between services, with no statistically significant 
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for four of the services examined: advertising and marketing, graphic 
design, computer software/MIS, and training provision. In a more 
detailed assessment, of the same survey data for five service fields, 
O’Farrell and Moffat (1991, Tables 1-6) find intensities of ‘client 
involvement’ to differ as a result of contrasts between service suppliers 
and between phases in the service creation process. 
 
In a different analysis of 364 UK executive recruitment consultancies 
and corporate personnel directors, Clark (1993, Tables 6 and 7) found 
written and other contracts to be an important part of the quality control 
mechanism of service delivery. Contractual guarantees were used in 70-
90% of cases relating to service quality specifications, although in only 
34% of cases was a fee refund for poor performance built into these 
contracts. Clark develops an important argument, which we draw on 
below, for expecting significant differences to occur for different types 
of service and different types of supplier depending on the mechanisms 
of trust development and/or external quality controls. He concludes that 
contracts largely reflect prior levels of trust not interaction intensity. In 
the recruitment industry, informal and personal trust mechanisms 
underpinned by contracts are strongest, whilst formalised institutional or 
regulatory codes are secondary: “It is contractual guarantees, and the 
history of past transactions underlying reputation, which overcome the 
potential effects of adverse selection and moral hazard” (Clark, 1993, p. 
250). 
 
We are aware that in focusing on just two measures of intensity and 
control of exchange in this paper (written contracts/briefs and site visits) 
we cannot encompass the full variety of the interaction process that is 
examined by Clark (1995), O’Farrell and Moffat (1991) and other 
writers. However, because our work is based on a large scale survey 
format with the requirement for relatively simple self-completion 
questions it was not possible to examine every stage of the exchange 
  13process. We have to trade off analysis of the depth of exchanges with the 
advantages of a very large sample size so that we can compare 
evaluations across a number of types of supplier and client which allow 
statistically valid generalisations to be drawn. 
 
In the following analysis the survey focuses on small and medium-sized 
firms of up to 500 employees. This survey has 2547 respondents and 
was undertaken in 1997. It follows the same procedures as previous 
ESRC CBR Surveys. It is based on a prior telephone contact to check 
that size and other sampling criteria are satisfied by the randomly 
selected firms. Final contact is then made by mail. A 25% response rate 
was achieved. Tests of non-response bias show this to be a valid 
database (Cosh and Hughes, 1998, Appendix) for comparisons of 
response rates by age, employment numbers, turnover, pre-tax profit and 
legal status of the firm. The only potential for response bias was found in 
a slightly higher, but statistically significant, refusal rate for large 
manufacturing firms (over 200 employees). This was chiefly the results 
of a higher rate of refusal to participate at the telephone checking stage. 
Response variations between questions are generally low. For the 
questions analysed here the average non-response rate was 3.2%, with 
the main non-responses being for impact assessment. This averages 
9.5% but does not have significant response bias between source type or 
firm type. The survey is a stratified random design which covers two 
broad industrial sectors: (i) manufacturing, and (ii) business services. 
Other details are given in Cosh and Hughes (1998). 
 
In the survey, the use of external advice is defined as excluding 
provision of basic information and is assessed for its impact in meeting 
business objectives, which are defined in the immediately preceding 
questions. Respondents were asked to identify each area and source of 
advice they had used to pursue their business objectives in the previous 
3 years, and to rate its impact in meeting business objectives. For the 
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the advice primarily involved a site visit and/or a written brief. 
 
We first examine eight sources of service supply and assess how 
measures of interaction intensity vary by firm type. Second, we examine 
variation in impact for different types of client firm and source as a 
result of varying intensities of interaction. The results at each stage 
combine survey tabulations with multivariate statistical estimation based 
on logit and ordered logit methods where respondent sample sizes 
permit. 
 
The eight service suppliers examined contrast a major category of 
private sector supplier (business consultants) with two types of business 
association (sector and local-based), and with various types of 
government-backed delivery body (enterprise agencies, TECs, LECs, 
Business Link, and Business Shop / Connect). These different suppliers 
were selected to provide a range of interaction intensities and contrasts 




Business consultants cover a wide range of differing service fields with 
differing technical skill requirements. For some specialist fields external 
self-regulation and quality assurance systems exist, e.g. in the legal, 
engineering, surveying and accountancy sub-disciplines. The main 
motives for SME clients to use consultants are to manage change 
processes, gain specialist knowledge, obtain intensive temporary help 
and obtain an outside view (Clark, 1995; Bryson, 1997), so that the 
greatest demand is normally for specialist rather than generalist advice 
(Hill and Neeley, 1988; Wood et al. 1993; Fitzsimmons et al. 1998). The 
quality of consultancy primarily depends on the individual advisors and 
their specific capacities. Because the market for consultants is so varied 
and the entry barriers so low there is likely to be a relatively low 
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therefore, that business consultants would experience a relatively high 
level of interaction intensity in order to tailor services, but that the buyer 
will make relatively high use of mechanisms for assessing and 
controlling quality, such as written briefs or contracts. 
 
Business associations are private sector voluntary bodies in Britain. 
Business owners or managers therefore choose to join or not. Two types 
of bodies are considered: sector associations and local chambers of 
commerce. Membership gives SMEs rights to certain association 
supports and services often financed by fees. The choice of membership 
is itself a vote of confidence or trust in the body. Therefore users are 
largely a self-selecting group. This is reinforced by constitutions of self-
regulation that seek to define the responsibilities of the association 
managers e.g. to act on behalf of their members. In the case of chambers 
of commerce, their main national body, the British Chambers of 
Commerce (BCC), has developed a relatively onerous accreditation and 
quality assurance system self-regulating and controlling the brand name 
“chamber”. Such quality assurance and accreditation processes are much 
less common among sectoral bodies, and indeed quality assurance has 
been the focus for the launch of a government initiative by DTI (1996) 
for a “model” trade association with a standard charter offering a duty of 
care to members and a model governance structure. The services 
provided by associations vary considerably, and previous studies have 
shown that their services are predominantly low cost, low frequency and 
low duration, but with high interconnectedness between service 
transactions requiring high human asset specificity (Taylor and 
Singleton, 1993; van Waarden, 1991; Bennett, 1996, 1998). We expect 
association services therefore to be areas exhibiting a relatively high 
level of institutional trust but a low level of intensity of interaction. 
Chambers generally have a higher membership proportion from medium-
sized SMEs, whilst sector associations are often dominated by large 
firms. As a result, trust levels may be higher in local chambers than 
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regulation and are dominated to a greater extent by SMEs. 
 
Enterprise agencies are a somewhat hybrid body. They are locally based, 
about 200 in number in 1998. Their financial backing is variable - most 
are sponsored and underwritten by local government, or TEC/LEC 
contracts, with large private companies giving significant in-kind and 
financial support in many cases (Bennett, 1995). Their predominant 
activity is advice and consultancy, particularly to micro SMEs and to 
start-ups, across a wide range of fields, but with business strategy, 
finance and government grants normally as their chief focus, requiring 
detailed business appraisal of a relatively intense kind. Their backing 
from sponsors tends to offer a fairly high level of institutional and 
sometimes individual trust; i.e. they are expected to behave in the 
interests of their clients and any fee income is a surplus normally 
ploughed back into the agency and not as a profit. They have also 
developed a self-regulation system of quality assurance and accreditation 
through the National Association of Enterprise Agencies, although this 
is not as yet very onerous. They can therefore be expected to be 
relatively high intensity and moderately high trust service suppliers. 
 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and their Scottish counterparts 
of Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) are government-financed bodies 
with predominantly private sector boards of management. They provide 
advice, support and some grants/subsidies to business in two main 
business fields: (i) training, including the Investor’s in People (IiP) 
programme, and (ii) advice and consultancy services chiefly focused on 
management development, diagnostic assessment, and consultancy. The 
Scotland LECs are integrated into the networks of Scottish Enterprise 
(SE) and Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE). This provides more 
substantial consultancy, larger grant aids, infrastructure supports, and 
export/trading supports than available from TECs (see Bennett et al., 
1994). We would expect TEC/LEC supports to have a relatively high 
  17level of interaction intensity and an intermediate level of trust. 
Institutional trust may be enhanced by the role of government regulation, 
but trust is undermined by perceptions of a rather chequered history of 
previous public intervention, particularly by TECs compared to LECs. 
 
Business Link (BL) is an initiative developed since 1992 in England, but 
only fully in place covering the whole country from late 1996. In 
Scotland a similar system of Business Shop (BS), and in Wales Business 
Connect (BC), has been developed. These systems seek to provide a 
local advice and consultancy service to SMEs ranging from specialist 
consultancy (on exports, marketing, innovation and technology, or 
product design) to generalised consultancy based on personal advisors, 
and provision of grants, which all require high or very high interaction 
intensity (see DTI, 1992; Agar and Moran, 1995; Priest, 1999). Trust is 
likely to be intermediate and to be chiefly institutional with little 
personal trust. Like TECs and LECs, with which they are closely related 
as contracting partners, they gain some reputation benefit from 
government-backing and regulation, but they are also undermined by 
perceptions of the previous history of public intervention which may 
encourage clients chiefly to use them to access grants or subsidies or as a 
last resort (see e.g. HoC, 1996). 
 
4. Empirical  Assessment 
 
The assessment which follows focuses on two indicators of interaction 
intensity. The first indicator, the use of site visits, is seen as a measure of 
interaction intensity that should be particularly relevant to differentiating 
between advice sources in our sample, of consultants, associations and 
public sector sources. Site visits differentiate simpler advice, that can be 
given off-site or over a telephone/Email, from more detailed advice that 
requires on-site assessment, exchanges and two-way learning between 
the supplier and client. Clearly a site visit may also allow the 
development of a level of trust, but this will be ex post not ex ante. Site 
  18visits are therefore primarily aimed at overcoming ex ante information 
asymmetries, chiefly of the supplier, and to a lesser extent those of the 
buyer. 
 
The second indicator used is the existence of a contract or written brief 
as part of the service delivery process. This is also an indicator of 
interaction intensity since it clearly distinguishes simple advice from the 
need for more detailed appraisal. But in our assessment we see its chief 
role, following Clark (1995), as an indicator of the selection process 
used, existence of trust, and the form of client mechanisms for control of 
the supplier. A high level of individual or institutional trust will reduce 
the need for client controls through a written brief or contract because ex 
ante signalling will overcome ex ante information asymmetries. In our 
case, associations for example, have a “brand” and constitution of self-
regulation which suggests that a perception of a high level ex ante 
quality assurance may exist, particularly in relation to the expectation of 
their services having relatively low interaction intensity. Hence written 
contracts for association advisors are likely to be relatively rare. At the 
other extreme, business consultants will usually have a low level of both 
individual and institutional trust so that the incidence of written 
contracts is expected to be relatively high. 
 
We are aware that neither indicator of interaction intensity that we use is 
perfect nor allows detail of the advice process to be fully examined. Our 
large scale sample and survey format did not allow this. To complement 
our analysis, therefore, we relate our large scale findings to more 
detailed studies where possible below. 
 
4.1 Types of supplier 
 
The extent to which site visits and written briefs/contracts are used for 
our eight different types of supplier
1 is shown in Table 1. This table 
shows the proportion of survey respondents who reported using a site 
  19visit or contract/brief for each source of supply. There is a very close 
relation to our prior expectations in terms of interaction intensity and 
expected level of control by contract. High interaction intensity, 
measured by the level of site visits, occurs for nearly 4 out of 5 cases in 
the case of business consultants. This is in line with other findings, such 
as those by O’Farrell and Moffat (1991) or Fitzsimmons et al. 1998). It 
is also high for TECs, LECs, BLs, BS/BC and enterprise agencies, all of 
which use site visits in more than half of cases. This is in line with DTI 
targets for these bodies. It is lowest in business associations, and within 
these it is lowest of all for sector associations. This sequence is in line 
with our expectations of interaction intensity based on the nature of the 
service that each body is providing. Site visits are higher for local 
chambers than sector bodies, presumably because it is easier at the local 
level than for a sector body that normally has only one national office. 
Chambers, on average, in any case have larger staff and offer a wider 
range of advice services requiring higher levels of interaction than most 
sector associations. 
 
The extent of use of a written brief/contract shown in Table 1 is also 
closely in line with our prior expectations about client mechanism for 
control of advisors and trust. Consultants have by far the highest 
incidence of written contracts, covering over one half of cases, which is 
indicative the need to have more intense exchanges to define objectives 
and to control quality. It is also indicative of a low level of personal and 
institutional trust. TECs, LECs, BL, BS/BC all have intermediate and 
relatively comparable levels of use of contracts, in the range of 35-40% 
of cases. This implies that a significantly higher level of trust applies to 
these government backed bodies than to consultants, as expected from 
the ease of consultant market entry and the general absence of strong 
forms of consultant self-regulation or accreditation mechanisms. 
However, the government-backed bodies all use contracts to a 
significantly greater extent than enterprise agencies or business 
associations. Government-backing and regulation of TECs/LECs and 
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and ex post quality assurance than for the enterprise agencies with which 
they are closely comparable. The very low levels of use of 
contracts/briefs by business associations reflects their high trust position 
based on self-regulation and a self-selecting membership, and it also 
reflects the relatively low intensity nature of many of the services they 
provide. 
 
The general level of use of contracts/briefs is lower than that found by 
O’Farrell and Moffat (1995) whose survey had 72% of their sample 
using a verbal or written brief for the services of advertising and 
marketing, graphic design, computer/MIS, and training. Clark (1993) 
found 50-90% use of contracts for different aspects of performance of 
recruitment consultants. The lower level of use found in our survey, 
even for consultants, probably reflects our focus on SMEs and the 
broader range of service types involved in our survey. Both O’Farrell 
and Moffat, and Clark, have large as well as small firms in their sample, 
and focus on a more limited range of specific consultancy services for 
which higher intensities of interaction are required, whereas our survey 
includes all advisor services. 
 
The extent to which different client types develop different levels of 
contracts and interaction intensity with their suppliers is shown in Tables 
2 and 3. Firstly, attention is focused upon the percentages of respondents 
reporting using a site visit. Statistically significant differences between 
types of firm are tested for each row sub-grouping. There are statistically 
significant differences for all sources by sector (except for SE/HIE 
LECs), in most cases by size, and to a lesser extent by growth history. 
 
Manufacturing firms in all cases use site visits to a significantly greater 
extent than service firms (Table 2). This probably arises from the greater 
technical requirements of understanding their production processes and 
assessing them on site. It is, however, a somewhat surprising result since 
  21the supply of advice services to service firms might be expected to 
require higher interaction intensity because of the greater effect of 
intangibility, inseparability, heterogeneity and perishability on both 
sides, of both the service provided and the outputs of the client supplied. 
 
The use of site visits, generally increases with firm size, although firm 
size differences are not significant for enterprise agencies, chambers, 
SE/HIE LECs and BS/BC. Both categories of growing companies use 
site visits to a greater extent than stable/declining ones, although again 
there is not a statistically significant difference for enterprise agencies 
and BS/BC. 
 
In the case of written briefs/contracts (Table 3), manufacturing 
companies use these to a greater extent in all cases, although this is 
strongly statistically significant only for the case of BS/BC. Written 
contracts increase for all sources with firm size, statistically significantly 
in all cases except BS/BC. For growth rates there are few systematic or 
significant effects, except for use of BL which increases strongly by 
growth rate, as to be expected given the targeting of BL on growth 
companies. 
 
Clearly many of the features of sector, firm size, etc., interact and may 
be collinear with each other. To control for these interactions, the results 
of multivariate logit estimation of the influences of firm type on site 
visits and written contracts as response variables are shown in Tables 4 
and 5. These estimates evaluate the influence of firm type for six of the 
service suppliers. The sample size for LECs and Business Shop/Connect 
in Scotland and Wales was too small to permit estimation
2. Preliminary 
tests of a variety of alternative variables showed that profit per employee 
or profit per level of turnover produced indistinguishable results. The log 
of employee numbers is used to capture the strongly developed pattern 
of the rapid increase in use of external suppliers with size up to 50-100 
employee companies, with a levelling off after that point (see Bennett 
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as used in earlier tables. Firm sector (services, manufacturing) and 
exporters are defined by (0,1) dummy variables. Skill level is defined by 
the percentage of graduates in the firm’s labour force. 
 
For all suppliers the models are statistically significant predictors of 
having either a site visit or written contract, correctly classifying 
responses in between 59% to 86% of cases. For site visits (Table 4) the 
chances of having a visit generally significantly increase for 
manufacturing compared to services, and by employee size. Chambers of 
commerce, however, display a very different pattern with skill levels and 
age (weakly) leading to significantly decreasing chances of having a site 
visit, whilst being an exporter significantly increases the chance of 
having a site visit. Business Link is also different in having only sector 
as a major explanatory variable of having a site visit. 
 
In general for interaction intensity we may conclude that, when 
estimated together, most firm type differences have only a limited 
influence or the chances of having a site visit. Size and sector are 
generally the two most highly significant explanatory variables. Age has 
little effect (although most of the firms in the sample are established, in 
the sense that most have been trading for at least 5 years). Profit per 
employee and exporting also have little effect, and rate of growth has no 
effect, on the chances of having a site visit. These results are surprising 
since it would be expected a priori that newer firms, more rapidly 
growing firms, exporting firms and less profitable firms might be 
expected to need more on-site interaction. However, these influences are 
only minor and only affect the interactions with one supplier at a low 
significance level. Skill levels were also expected a priori to be an 
important influence or interaction intensity since higher skill levels 
should allow the client better to specify their needs without on-site 
assessment. But this variable is significant only in the case of chambers 
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expected. 
 
In the case of written brief/contracts, the estimates in Table 5 show an 
even narrower range of firm type influences. Size of firm is a highly 
significant positive influence on the chance of receiving a contract from 
consultants, associations, enterprise agencies and (weakly) for Business 
Link. For Business Link the rate of growth, the skill level and to a lesser 
extent profitability are also of significance, respectively at the 95% and 
90% levels. But in all other cases there are no significant explanatory 
variables at the 95% level or greater, other than the employee size of the 
firm. For chambers of commerce and TECs there is no significant firm 
type influence at all. 
 
These results show that in the case of written brief/contracts it is supplier 
characteristics, and hence their ‘trust’ or brand/reputation, which is the 
main influence on the strong differences in the level of use of contracts 
evident in Table 1. In a systematic way, only firm size is a major 
influence which increases the chance of a written contract. This indicates 
that larger firms are generally better able to specify their needs and are 
also seeking to control their relations with advisors to a greater extent. In 
this sense larger SMEs rely to a much lesser extent on trust than smaller 
firms. 
 
In the case of site visits, interaction intensity is more broadly related to 
firm type differences such as size and sector, but again most other 
variables are of little significance (except for skill levels for chambers of 
commerce). We conclude that it is supplier type that is chiefly 
accounting for the differences in interaction intensity evident in Table 1 
rather than firm type. Where firm type influences are strongest, they 
indicate that intensity increases with firm size and for manufacturing, 
and for lower skill levels for chambers, suggesting that larger, more 
  24complex and generally manufacturing firms need more detailed 




We expect higher interaction intensity to produce higher impacts 
because a greater exchange has taken place between buyer and seller so 
that business needs shoud be better understood. The general level of 
impact in relation to site visits and written brief/contract is shown in 
Table 6. “Impact on meeting business objectives” is assessed by 
respondents on a 5-point scale from 1 (no impact) to 5 (crucial impact). 
The mid point is 3 (moderate impact). 
 
Advice based on site visits has highest impact for consultants (mean 
impact 2.8) and ranks downwards to sector associations and BS/BC, 
TECs, chambers, LECs, BL and finally enterprise agencies. Across all 
suppliers, clients that had a site visit always have a higher impact 
measure than those that do not, on average. This is generally about half a 
point higher. The differences are greatest, exceeding one half a point, for 
TECs, BL and BS/BC. 
 
Advice based on written contracts has a very similar rank order of 
impacts, although the impacts of BL, LECs and TECs is now relatively 
much higher. In all cases clients using a written contract on average 
receive higher impact than these that do not, except for BS/BC. The 
differences in ratings achieved by having a contract are a little lower 
than for site visits, but approach half a point in most cases, and 
differences are greatest for TECs/LECs, chambers and BL. 
 
Tests of client type differences by simple cross tabulation show few very 
statistically significant differences, although manufacturing firms 
generally have higher impacts on average where they have contracts 
and/or site visits. To save space these tabulations are not shown, but in 
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for different client types using an ordered logit model. In these tables the 
response variable is the five levels of impact assessed by the client, and 
the existence or not of a site visit or written contract appear as (0,1) 
dummy variables. 
 
The results of Table 7 for the client impact of site visits show that in all 
cases, except trade and professional associations, the existence of a site 
visit significantly increases client assessments of impact of advice. This 
is a strong confirmation of the general expectation that stronger intensity 
of interaction increases the tailoring of a service to SME needs, therefore 
improving its quality and potential impact. The lack of relation of site 
visits to the impact assessment for trade and professional associations, 
and the very weak relation for chambers of commerce, suggest that the 
clients of these bodies are using site visits for a different purpose than 
tailoring of the advice service. Since both are forms of business 
collective activity, it is possible that the site visit is less concerned with 
tailoring the service than with recruitment or maintaining membership, 
the development of relational exchange, social relations, or development 
of trust. 
 
Beyond the influence of site visits, few firm type variables are of major 
statistical significance in explaining the level of client impact assessment 
of advice. For consultants the size of the company, its profit levels, and 
whether it is an exporter, are of significance. For other suppliers, firm 
size is important only for the impact of TECs, and for exporters impact 
increases in the case of chambers and Business Link, but decreases for 
TECs. Skill levels inversely influence impact for trade and professional 
associations. 
 
The major conclusion from these estimates is that interaction intensity 
derived through site visits for most supplier types is the main systematic 
feature explaining higher impact levels. As indicated by comparison of 
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than supplier type. The exception is the case of consultants where firm 
size, profitability levels and whether it is an exporter are also strong 
influences on impact. This conclusion suggests that businesses tend 
generally to choose their suppliers of advice in line with their perceived 
needs, tailoring the service through site visits in different intensities, 
receiving impacts related chiefly to supplier characteristics for the 
different services they supply, though in all cases (except trade and 
professional associations), clients receive a higher impact as a result of 
higher intensity of interaction. The exception of business consultants 
suggests that larger firms, more profitable firms and non-exporting firms 
receive higher impacts as a result not only of the higher interaction 
intensity of a site visit but also because these types of firms exert a 
stronger control on intensity of interaction because of their specific 
needs. For consultants, therefore, firm type as well as supplier 
characteristics are strong influences on the impact of interaction 
intensity. This is in line with findings by Jackson et al. (1995) and 
Brentani and Ragot (1996). 
 
Table 8 shows the client impact assessment of written brief/contracts. 
Similar though less strong results are indicated as for site visits. Written 
briefs/contracts increase impact significantly for most cases, but not for 
trade and professional associations or enterprise agencies. Firm type 
variables of significance are again chiefly relevant for consultants where 
again it is the larger, more profitable and non-exporting SMEs that 
receive higher impact. Firm size is also a significant explanatory variable 
for the impact of TECs, and exporting is an explanatory variable of 
significance for chambers and Business Link. Skill level again has an 
inverse influence on impact levels for trade and professional 
associations. 
 
The key conclusion to be drawn from these results is that supplier type is 
the most important influence on impact levels. Impacts are also 
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between firms are generally of little significance compared to supplier 
differences (compare Table 6 and 8). The chief exception is consultants. 
Their predominantly low trust relation and low levels of repeat business 
indicate the greater need for clients to control outputs. Our findings are 
that consultants generate higher impacts, the more that a contract is used, 
the larger the firm, the higher its profitability and the greater the extent 
to which it is a non-exporter. This confirms the greater ability of 
consultants to fit their marketing and services better to their clients, 
features which were found to be the key determinant of consultant 
impact in the study by Brentani and Ragot (1996). Our results also 
suggest that large SMEs are better able to use and control consultants 
than smaller SMEs. 
 
5.  Assessment and Conclusion 
 
This paper has compared different suppliers and types of clients using a 
measure of interaction intensity based on site visits, and the degree of 
control exerted by the client over the advisor, based on written 
briefs/contracts. Although there are certainly constraints on the level of 
detail of our analysis which makes it impossible to examine the variety 
of transaction characteristics, or details of each stage of the advice 
process, the large sample survey does allow the benefits of 
generalisation across a wide range of businesses which permits large 
scale comparison of suppliers and firm types through statistical analysis. 
We have confirmed our two key hypothesis; (i) that interaction intensity 
varies between types of suppliers and appears to depend on both client-
supplier intensity and formality of relations, and on contrasts of external 
mechanisms for controlling quality, developing reputation and producing 
trust; and (ii) that outputs are evaluated by SME clients as having higher 
impact the higher the interaction intensity in service delivery, and the 
higher the level of control by contract. 
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variation in interaction intensity and the use of a written brief/contract. A 
summary of the main findings is shown in Table 9. Consultants, 
enterprise agencies and all the government-backed agencies have a high 
interaction intensity chiefly derived from their delivery of tailored 
services requiring extensive exchanges on-site between client and 
supplier. As anticipated from the predominantly low cost, low 
frequency, and low duration of services provided by business 
associations, interaction intensity is generally relatively low with a 
smaller proportion of service delivered through use of site visits.   
 
A different situation applies to the existence of written briefs/contracts, 
used here as an indictor of reputation and trust. Contracts are most 
important for consultants, used in over one-half of cases. This certainly 
reflects the individuality and tailoring required of the service by 
consultants, but it also suggests that clients recognise their strong 
dependence on an individual or a small group of individual consultants 
as the supplier, the ease of their market entry, and the low level of 
professional self-regulation or government regulation of the consultancy 
sector. These factors mean that clients seek to exert a high degree of 
control on consultants through contracts, indicating a relatively low trust 
requiring closer prior agreement to control ex ante information 
asymmetries. Contracts are used to a lesser extent for all other suppliers, 
ranging from 36% to 29% for the public agents, to 28% for enterprise 
agencies, and 16% for the business associations. We interpret this as 
being an inverse relation to the extent to which an institutional trust 
exists deriving from either self-regulation or government regulation. 
 
Interaction intensity and reputation based on trust appear to interchange 
with each other in terms of impact. Our results indicate that high 
interaction intensity, and a low level of reputation and regulation leading 
to a written contract, result in a service with highest impact being 
received from consultants. Their services have the highest mean impact 
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“crucial” and of “important”. All the other suppliers have significantly 
lower impact assessments. However a variety of other mechanisms 
appear to be at work. Where business associations tend to produce 
medium impacts through low interaction intensity but have high 
reputation or trust, government agencies produce medium impacts 
through high intensity with medium trust. This suggests that government 
agents tailor their services chiefly through interaction and contracts, 
whereas business associations can draw on a higher level of previous 
experience of related transactions and tacit knowledge from the self-
selecting members. This in turn confirms the conclusions of Bennett 
(1996, 1998) that both local and sector associations rely on high human 
asset specificity drawing on tacit knowledge and the high 
interconnectedness between related and/or repeat transactions for the 
fields of advice that they offer. 
 
In general, therefore, although the measures we use limit the 
interpretations that can be drawn, our results confirm the suggestions 
made by Clark (1993, 1995), of contrasts between suppliers in terms of a 
trade off between ex ante and ex post information asymmetries on the 
one hand, and levels of reputation, regulation and trust between client 
and supplier on the other hand. Perhaps the surprising result is the rather 
ambiguous position held by enterprise agencies, Scottish Business Shop, 
and Welsh Business Connect. These suppliers each tend to have high 
interaction intensities and comparable levels of use of written contracts. 
Yet they have some of the lowest impacts overall. More detailed analysis 
in each case is clearly required. It is probably the case that Business 
Shop and Business Connect differ from Business Link and TECs/LECs 
because their design seeks them to be chiefly first stop shops referring 
the client to other suppliers. The advice they result in giving, therefore, 
may be focused on fields where impacts are more diffuse, assessments 
more preliminary, or in fields where there is lower value added. Since 
BS/BC is designed chiefly as an information, referral and gap-filling 
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low impact of enterprise agencies is a more uncomfortable finding. They 
offer a high interaction intensity service with a moderately high use of 
contracts, yet their delivery appears to have one of the lowest impacts 
overall. This suggests that their accreditation and quality control systems 
may be in need of tightening and review. 
 
The analysis also shows how service impacts, use of contracts and the 
levels of interaction intensities vary by client type. One of the main 
benefits of the large scale survey is the ability to assess the effects of 
these client type differences. Use of logit and ordered logit multivariate 
estimates has allowed a range of the explanatory variables normally used 
to measure differences in client type to be explored. In general these 
estimates show that firm type is a much less important distinguishing 
characteristic than supplier type. This is itself a major finding indicating 
that clients choose suppliers chiefly for the bundling of their advice 
characteristics rather than their specific focus on particular types of firm. 
This in turn suggests that suppliers of advice appear to develop more 
into niche markets of particular services or bundles of services rather 
than markets filled with particular types of client businesses. This is in 
line with the suggestions by Nayyar (1990) and Clark (1995) that 
suppliers can overcome some information asymmetries by transferring 
their reputation to a range of services, provided that clients see this as 
legitimate and that the services are compatible. 
 
There are exceptions to this general pattern. Higher interaction intensity 
and use of contracts is generally more likely with larger SMEs and 
manufacturing firms. Among suppliers, business consultants also appear 
to be an important special case. Their low reputation and trust appears to 
lead to a significantly higher intensity of interaction, resulting in a 
higher level of control through contracts, with a greater level of tailoring 
exerted by large SMEs, the most profitable firms and non-exporting 
firms. The benefit of this extra commitment to tailoring the service by 
  31both supplier and client is a significantly higher impact for business 
consultants than for other suppliers. This suggests that between SMEs 
there are important size differences between firms in how effectively 
they can use consultants. For the other suppliers of advice assessed here 
size influences on impact are less important, although still significant. 
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1.  In the tables we report the use of sector associations and chambers 
of commerce separately. Many respondents combined the two 
sources because of the design of the survey. The responses 
tabulated relate to respondents using only one or the other of these 
sources, not both. 
 
2.  Note that the samples for estimation for the TECs applies to 
England and Wales, for Business Link to England only, and for the 
other suppliers to the whole sample. 
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Table 1. Percentage of respondents reporting using a site visit and/or written briefs/contracts 
 
Supplier  Site Visit  Written Brief/Contract 
Consultants 78.6  50.6 
Trade or Professional Associations  20.8  16.4 
Chambers 29.9  16.4 
Local Enterprise Agencies  54.9  28.0 
TECs   64.5  39.0 
SE/HIE LECs  74.5  36.2 
Business Link  72.9  36.9 
Business Shop & Connect  60.0  36.7 
 
 
  34 
Table 2.   Percentage of respondents reporting using a site visit by firm type, size, and growth.  (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1) 
Tested using Mann Whitney test for two group comparisons, or the Kruskal-Wallis test for multigroup comparisons, between column 
entries. Types of business are defined as: micro - less than 10 employees, small business between 10 and 99 employees, medium/larger 
businesses between 100 and 499 employees.  Employment growth of business during last three years: stable/declining businesses with zero 
or negative growth;   medium-growth greater than 0% and less than 40%; and fast-growth 40% or greater. 
 
 












Consultants  83.8***              71.5*** 64.7*** 82.9*** 87.8*** 72.8*** 85.3*** 79.3*** 
Trade or Professional Associations  26.0***        16.1*** 15.3** 24.4** 27.9**  17.9 26.7 19.8 
Chambers  34.3**              18.8**  31.3 30.0 23.1 27.7 32.2 35.8
Local Enterprise Agencies  61.4***              45.1***  48.6 60.5 54.3 51.0 52.9 59.8
TECs   68.7***              56.0*** 55.9** 66.1** 74.0**  60.8 69.0 72.7
SE/HIE LECs   84.0  63.6  64.7  84.0  60.0  50.0**    72.7** 100.0** 
Business Link  77.3***              62.8*** 61.7*** 79.6*** 68.8*** 62.7*** 76.2*** 79.6*** 
Business Shop & Connect  76.5**      38.5**  69.2 50.0 100.0 42.9 100.0 72.7 
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Table 3. Percentage of respondents reporting using a written brief/contract by firm type, size, and growth. (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 
0.05; * p < 0.1, tested as in Table 2) 
 
  Sector  Size  Growth 






Consultants            52.1  48.6  39.1*** 52.2*** 64.9***  52.9 56.0 48.3
Trade or Professional Associations  12.6  11.4  8.9* 12.4*        19.7*  12.4 11.6 12.8
Chambers  17.1                14.5 13.1 19.2 15.4 20.0 15.3 18.9
Local Enterprise Agencies  31.6*              22.5* 20.7*** 29.9*** 45.7***  27.0 30.0 31.0
TECs   41.2  34.2  34.6**          37.2** 52.1**  40.8 44.4 44.7
SE/HIE  LECs                    40.0 31.8 17.6 44.0 60.0 50.0 27.3 46.7
Business Link  37.2  36.1  29.5**          39.6** 44.2** 31.4** 36.1** 45.1** 
Business Shop & Connect  58.8***              7.7***  30.8 41.7 66.7 42.9 66.7 45.5
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Table 4. Estimates of a logit model of the expectation of having a site visit, by supplier source (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1). 
Note that the samples for estimation for the TECs applies to England and Wales, for Business Link to England only, and for the 
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N        531  271 138  222  348 394
Log-likelihood              -241.91 -130.59 -75.38 -142.72 -211.41 -215.19
% Correctly Classified  80.23  78.23  70.29  62.61  67.53  75.38 
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Table 5. Estimates of a logit model of the expectation of having a written brief/contract, by supplier source (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 
0.05; * p < 0.1). 
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N        531  271 138  222  348 394
Log-likelihood              -355.06 -100.72 -68.26 -125.54 -233.63 -252.70
% Correctly Classified  58.57  86.35  79.71  72.07  59.48  62.18 
            
       
 
  38 









        
Consultants  2.80*** 2.48*** 2.89*** 2.57*** 
Trade or Professional 
Associations 
2.67** 2.42**  2.64 2.49 
Chambers  2.54*** 2.09*** 2.60*** 2.14*** 
Local Enterprise Agencies  2.48*** 2.03*** 2.58*** 2.16*** 
TECs   2.59*** 2.00*** 2.69*** 2.20*** 
SE/HIE LECs  2.51  2.55  2.86  2.54 
Business Link  2.51*** 1.96*** 2.66*** 2.18*** 
Business Shop & Connect  2.67  1.91  2.27  2.44 
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Table 7. Multivariate estimates of an ordered logit model of the client assessments of the impact of site visits (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 





Consultants  Trade or Professional 
Associations 
Chambers  Local Enterprise 
Agencies 















































































































N              521 267 133 216 339 385
Log-likelihood          -739.06 -325.95 -156.19  -290.15 -457.72  -527.45
            
 
  
Table 8. Multivariate estimates of an ordered logit model of the client assessments of the impact of written contracts (*** p < 0.01; 





Consultants  Trade or Professional 
Associations 
Chambers  Local Enterprise 
Agencies 


















































































































N              521 267 133 216 339 385
Log-likelihood          -739.38 -326.15 -154.19  -293.71 -459.21  -529.90




Table 9. Summary of research findings comparing sources of business advice in 
level of use of site visits and written contracts, and possible interpretations of the 
relation between interaction intensity, level and source of trust and impact 
 








(used to infer 
level of trust)
 
Source of trust  Impact 
Consultants high  low  some  branding by larger firms, and 












low  high  constitution, membership, self-





high medium  self-accredition, and contract 
structure with TECs/LECs 
 
low 
TECs high  medium  government regulation  medium 
 
LECs high  medium  government regulation  medium 
 
BL high  medium  government regulation  medium 
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